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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
S I \ I I- M l I I I \! Il 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI, 
Defet 
Case No. 20040080-CA 
ARGIJMENT 
POINT I 
I HE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE S TA I E COMPLIED WITH 120-DAY 
DISPOSITION STATUTE AND THEREFORE WHETHER DISMISSAL WAS 
APPROPRIATE WAS SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED BELOW 
. ii- State's firs 1 LHII. Il.iil M'lhi tli I HMI pivsrn r the issue of w hefliei II ' f,if 
complied with the 120-day disposition statute sufficiently to trigger the trial court's duty 
l o m | e o n the proceeding, v* iiKomvl A' <I • ^l.ilc a»ii< d h noK'd 1 ijn nulr" I preserve 
an issue for appeal, it 'must be raised in a timely fashion, must be specifically raised such 
that the issue is sufficiently raised fu ,i Inel .i! runs, biir.ncss hi loir llir IM;II coiui .uhl • 
must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State v. Richins, 2004 UT 
App 36, f 8 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UTApp (f»i>, ^ i1),, 5S IV kl X7*Ui|iioiiiiioiiN 
and citations omitted)). As will be demonstrated, the 120-day disposition issue was 
preserved in this case. 
The State noted in its brief, before the jury was impaneled, that there was an 
unrecorded bench conference ®. 165:5). After the jury was impaneled, the coi ii I: 
reminded defense counsel that "[o]ne thing you wanted to address, Mr. Simms, at this 
1 
stage, was the 120-day notice of disposition, which was apparently filed by the defendant. 
.. " ®. 165: 28). Mahi, through counsel, then presented to the court the following: 
Mr. Simms [defense counsel]: These are the documents that the defendant handed 
me this morning. I think his argument is that he gave the jail authorities the 120-
day disposition on June 20th, despite the fact that it's marked by the jail officials as 
July 12,2003. 
The Court: That's his position? 
Mr. Simms: Yes. 
The Court: Do you wish to respond, Mr. Knell? 
Mr. Knell [prosecutor]: Yes, your honor. I believe my copy also says June 20th. I 
guess it wasn't received by jail personnel until July 15th. However, I think there 
was a good faith exception here, in that the defendant was not transported on 
several occasions, at least three or four, when he wasn't transported. So I would 
argue that the defendant himself has caused any undue delay. 
The Court: It is clear that the date that apparently Mr. Mahi placed on the notice 
was 20, June. 
It is also clear that the state, or excuse me, that the jail authorities, jail 
authorities placed the date of 15, July. That then creates, I suppose, an issue of 
fact in that scenario, which we can not address here today. 
This is the first time that it has come to my attention that we had an issue of 
this nature being presented. I'll grant you the original, or a copy of this document 
was filed on July 17th in the court file. At the time the file was still winding its 
way, I believe, to this court from the preliminary stages. 
So without ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the motion, you have 
preserved your record in that regard. 
®. 165:28-30 (emphasis added)). 
From this exchange it appears to be clear that the issue of whether the state had 
complied with the 120-day disposition statute was sufficiently raised and addressed by all 
parties present. First, there was previously an unrecorded bench conference during which 
the issue was likely discussed, perhaps in even greater detail, and that the Court was 
aware of the issue evidenced by the trial judge's specific reminder to defense counsel of 
the one thing he wanted to address- the 120-day notice of disposition. ®. 165:5). 
Second, the State also clearly understood the 120-disposition issue was before the 
2 
court and therefore addressed the merits of the argument. Specifically, the state implicitly 
argue i = : c case si be dismissed because the delays should be attributed to the 
defendant who was not transported for several previous hearings. ®. 165: 29). 
Final Court manifested its eiear understanding oi l^ 120-day disposition 
issue raised by Mahi by recognizing the discrepancy between the date Mahi plated on (In 
notice In I vltlu ami the date he claimed to have delivered it to the jail authorities, and the 
date marked by the jail authorities on the notice as having been received. ®. 165: 29). 
specifically recognized this created an issue of fact that it could not 
address that day and stated that ''without ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the 
motion sou Iia\e preserved your record ii i that regard, Mi Sininis/" fc j65:20-
30(emphasis added)). 
II in * 11. in 111. i. I,In 11 Ids I "I 11;is disposition motion, including the implicit 
consequence of dismissal for the State's alleged failure to comply with the statute, was 
"sufl u ••/! . of conscioi isness before 1,1 le trial COUP - - lhatthe trial 
judge recognized it was addressing a motion and that the issue was preserved for the 
'h'ufttl A7j/r v Ittrhn" '(Mil " " I \|ij -e }\ K (quolmg State v. Schultz, )M\1 11 I' App 
366, TJ19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted)). Furthermore, the issue raised 
was "si lpported b\ e\ idence oi i ek ( ""ai it k gal ai itl IOI it> " > ' 1 lie 1 I, it i this case, was Mahi's 
claims that he delivered the 120-day notice prior to the day marked on it by the jail 
authorities and the date o ( lime MI1" on \Uy iim-iimi/nt * \\^vi<\ b^ N lain. (/,/.) 1 he State's 
argument that this issue was not preserved is, therefore, without merit. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 120-DAY DISPOSITION PERIOD HAD 
LAPSED PRIOR TO TRIAL IS IN PART A FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE AND WHICH IS 
NECESSARY FOR A MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW 
3 
The State next claims that regardless of whether the 120-day disposition issue was 
preserved, the defendant was tried within the 120-disposition period and was therefore 
not entitled to dismissal of the information. This argument, however, is without sufficient 
support in the record to be upheld. As set out above, there remained an undecided issue 
of fact that the trial court implicitly correctly recognized would have a direct bearing on 
the issue of whether the State had complied with the 120-day statute. ®. 165:29). That 
undecided issue is when was the 120-day notice delivered to the jail authorities? Was it, 
as Mahi claimed, the date on which he signed the notice and claims to have delivered it to 
the jail authorities, or was it the date on the top of the notice placed there by the jail 
authorities as having been received? 
The answer to this question bears directly on the question of whether the State 
complied with the 120-day disposition statute requiring the Slate to bring the defendant to 
trial within 120 days of the date the notice was delivered to jail authorities. The trial 
court correctly recognized this discrepancy as creating an issue of fact, the determination 
of which was necessary to the resolution of the issue. Unfortunately, however, the trial 
court simply stated that it was an issue that could not be addressed that day and "without 
ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the motion" the record had been preserved. ®. 
165:29-30). 
Such a situation leaves this Court in the position of having to make findings of fact 
that are necessary to the determination of an issue preserved below but not ruled upon. 
As this Court has set forth time and time again factual determinations are the exclusive 
purview of the fact finder (in this case the trial judge) which is in a better position of 
hearing the relevant evidence personally, observing the demeanor of the witnesses, and 
assessing their credibility or lack thereof. American Fork City v. Singleton, 57 P.3d 1124, 
4 
1125-1126 (Utah App. 2002)(quotations and citations omitted)(See also South Salt Lake 
City v. Terhelson, 2002 UT.App. 405, ^ {16, 61 P.3d 282 (Utah.App. 2002). It is for this 
reason that the State's argument that Mahi was tried within the 120-day disposition period 
cannot prevail- because this Court cannot come to that conclusion without the aid of a 
proper proceeding and appropriate factual findings below. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Mahi asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction and/or remand his case to the district court to make 
specific findings of fact regarding the issue of when the 120-day disposition notice was 
delivered to jail authorities in order to reach a proper resolution of his claim that the State 
did not bring him to trial in a timely manner as prescribed by statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of July, 2005. 
*atrick V. Lindsa; 
Counsel for Appellant 
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